Introduction
All innovative reactor concepts make use of passive safety features, to a large extent in combination with active safety and operational systems (Mackay et al., 2008) . According to the definitions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a passive system does not need external input (especially energy) to operate (IAEA, 1991) , while they are expected to contribute significantly to the safety of nuclear power plants thanks to their peculiar characteristics of simplicity, reduction of human interaction and reduction or avoidance of hardware failures (Mathews et al., 2008) .
However, the uncertainties involved in the modelling and functioning of passive systems are usually larger than for active systems. This is due to: i) the intrinsically random nature of several of the physical phenomena involved in the functioning of the system (aleatory uncertainty); ii) the incomplete knowledge on the physics of some of these phenomena (epistemic uncertainty) (Apostolakis, 1990; Helton, 2004) .
Due to these uncertainties, the physical phenomena involved in the passive system functioning (e.g., natural circulation) might develop in such a way to lead the system to fail its intended function, even if safety margins are present. In fact, deviations in the natural forces and in the conditions of the underlying physical principles from the expected ones can impair the function of the system itself (Marquès et al., 2005; Patalano et al., 2008) .
The problem may be analytically framed by introducing the concept of functional failure, whereby a passive system may fail to perform its function due to deviations from its expected behavior which lead the load imposed on the system to exceed its capacity (Burgazzi, 2003; Burgazzi, 2007) . This concept has been exploited in a number of works presented in the literature (Jafari et al., 2003; Marquès et al., 2005; Pagani et al., 2005; Bassi and Marquès, 2008; Fong and Apostolakis, 2008; Mackay et al., 2008; Mathews et al., 2008; Patalano et al., 2008; Zio and Pedroni, 2009a and b) , in which the passive system is modeled by a detailed, mechanistic T-H system code and the probability of failing to perform the required function is estimated based on a Monte Carlo (MC) sample of code runs which propagate the epistemic (state-of-knowledge) uncertainties in the model and the numerical values of its parameters/variables.
Since the probabilities of functional failure of passive systems are generally very small (e.g., of the order of 10 -4 ), a large number of samples is necessary for acceptable estimation accuracy (Schueller, 2007) ; given that the time required for each run of the detailed, mechanistic T-H system code is of the order of several hours (Fong and Apostolakis, 2008) , the MC simulation-based procedure typically requires considerable computational efforts.
A viable approach to overcome the computational burden associated to the analysis is that of resorting to fast-running, surrogate regression models, also called response surfaces or metamodels, to substitute the long-running T-H model code. The construction of such regression models entails running the T-H model code a predetermined, reasonably large but feasibly small, number of times (e.g., of the order of 50-100) for specified values of the uncertain input parameters/variables and recording the corresponding values of the output of interest; then, statistical techniques are employed for fitting the response surface of the regression model to the input/output data generated.
Several kinds of surrogate meta-models have been recently applied to safety related nuclear, structural and hydrogeological problems, including polynomial Response Surfaces (RSs) (Bucher and Most, 2008; Fong and Apostolakis, 2008; Gavin and Yau, 2008; Liel et al., 2009 ), Gaussian meta-models (Volkova et al., 2008; Marrel et al., 2009) and learning statistical models such as Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), Radial Basis Functions (RBFs) and Support Vector Machines (SVMs) (Deng, 2006; Hurtado, 2007; Cardoso et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2008) .
In this work, the possibility of using Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) and quadratic Response Surfaces (RSs) to reduce the computational burden associated to the functional failure analysis of a natural convection-based decay heat removal system of a Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) (Pagani et al., 2005) is investigated. To keep the practical applicability in sight, a small set of input/output data examples is considered available for constructing the ANN and quadratic RS models: different sizes of the (small) data sets are considered to show the effects of this relevant practical aspect. The comparison of the potentials of the two regression techniques in the case at hand is made with respect to the estimation of the 95 th percentile of the naturally circulating coolant temperature and the functional failure probability of the passive system.
Actually, the use of regression models in safety critical applications like nuclear power plants still raises concerns with regards to the control of their accuracy; in this paper, the bootstrap method is used for quantifying, in terms of confidence intervals, the uncertainty associated to the estimates provided by the ANNs and quadratic RSs (Efron and Thibshirani, 1993; Zio, 2006; Cadini et al., 2008; Secchi et al., 2008; Storlie et al., 2008) .
The paper organization is as follows. In Section 2, a snapshot on the functional failure analysis of T-H passive systems is given. Section 3 is devoted to the detailed presentation of the bootstrapbased method for quantifying, in terms of confidence intervals, the model uncertainty associated to the estimates of safety parameters computed by ANN and quadratic RS regression models. In Section 4, the case study of literature concerning the passive cooling of a GFR is presented. In Section 5, the results of the application of bootstrapped ANNs and quadratic RSs to the percentile and functional failure probability estimations are compared. Finally, conclusions are provided in the last Section.
The quantitative steps of functional failure analysis of T-H passive systems
The basic steps of the quantitative phase of the functional failure analysis of a T-H passive system are (Marquès et al., 2005 ):
1. Detailed modeling of the passive system response by means of a deterministic, best-estimate (typically long-running) T-H code.
2. Identification of the parameters/variables, models and correlations (i.e., the inputs to the T-H code) which contribute to the uncertainty in the results (i.e., the outputs) of the best estimate T-H calculations.
3. Propagation of the uncertainties through the deterministic, long-running T-H code in order to estimate the functional failure probability of the passive system.
Step 3. above relies on multiple (e.g., many thousands) evaluations of the T-H code for different combinations of system inputs; this can render the associated computing cost prohibitive, when the running time for each T-H code simulation takes several hours (which is often the case for T-H passive systems).
The computational issue may be tackled by replacing the long-running, original T-H model code by a fast-running, surrogate regression model (properly built to approximate the output from the true system model). In this paper, classical three-layered feed-forward Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) (Bishop, 1995) and quadratic Response Surfaces (RSs) (Liel et al., 2009) (Zio, 2006) . It can be assumed that the target vector y is related to the input vector x by an unknown nonlinear deterministic function ( )
Notice that in the present case of T-H passive system functional failure probability assessment the vector x contains the relevant uncertain system parameters/variables, the nonlinear deterministic function ( )
represents the complex, long-running T-H mechanistic model code (e.g., RELAP5-3D), the vector y(x) contains the output variables of interest for the analysis and the noise ( ) x ε represents the errors introduced by the numerical methods employed to calculate ( ) x µ y (Storlie et al., 2008) ; for simplicity, in the following we assume ( ) (Secchi et al., 2008) . 
Once built, the regression model f(x, w * ) can be used in place of the T-H code to calculate any quantity of interest Q, such as the 95 th percentile of a physical variable critical for the system under analysis (e.g., the fuel cladding temperature) or the functional failure probability of the passive system.
In this work, the capabilities of quadratic Response Surface (RS) and three-layered feed-forward Artificial Neural Network (ANN) regression models are compared in the computational tasks involved in the functional failure analysis of a T-H passive system. In extreme synthesis, quadratic
RSs are polynomials containing linear terms, squared terms and possibly two-factors interactions of the input variables (Liel et al., 2009) ; the RS adaptable parameters w * are usually calibrated by straightforward least squares methods. ANNs are computing devices inspired by the function of the nerve cells in the brain (Bishop, 1995 (Rumelhart et al., 1986) . The particular type of ANN employed in this paper is the classical three-layered feedforward ANN trained by the error back-propagation algorithm.
The details of these two regression models are not reported here for brevity: the interested reader may refer to the cited references and the copious literature in the field.
The bootstrap method
The approximation of the system output provided by an empirical regression model introduces an additional source of uncertainty, which needs to be evaluated, particularly in safety critical applications like those related to nuclear power plant technology. One way to do this is by resorting to bootstrapped regression models (Efron and Thibshirani, 1993) , i.e., an ensemble of regression models constructed on different data sets bootstrapped from the original one (Zio, 2006; Storlie et al., 2008) . The bootstrap method is a distribution-free inference method which requires no prior knowledge about the distribution function of the underlying population (Efron and Thibshirani, 1993) . The basic idea is to generate a sample from the observed data by sampling with replacement from the original data set (Efron and Thibshirani, 1993) . From the theory and practice of ensemble empirical models, it can be shown that the estimates given by bootstrapped regression models is in general more accurate than the estimate of the best regression model in the bootstrap ensemble of regression models (Zio, 2006; Cadini et al., 2008) .
In what follows, the steps of the bootstrap-based technique of evaluation of the so-called Bootstrap (Gazut et al., 2008) .
Build a regression model f(x, w
* ) on the basis of the entire data set
(step 1. above) in order to obtain a fast-running surrogate of the T-H model code represented by the unknown nonlinear deterministic function µ y (x) in
(1).
3. Use the regression model f(x, w * ) (step 2. above), in place of the original T-H model code, to provide a point estimate Q of the quantity Q, e.g., the 95 th percentile of a system variable of interest or the functional failure probability of the T-H passive system. a. Generate a bootstrap data set
by performing random sampling with replacement from the original data set 
The BBC estimate BBC Q in (3) is taken as the definitive point estimate for Q.
The explanation for expression (3) 
, respectively, in the ordered list
An important advantage of the bootstrap method is that it provides confidence intervals for a given quantity Q without making any model assumptions (e.g., normality); a disadvantage is that the computational cost could be high when the set D train and the number of adaptable parameters w * in the regression models are large.
Case study
The case study considered in this work concerns the natural convection cooling in a Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) under a post-Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) condition (Pagani et al., 2005) .
The reactor is a 600-MW GFR cooled by helium flowing through separate channels in a silicon carbide matrix core whose design has been the subject of study in the past several years at the Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT) (Pagani et al., 2005) .
A GFR decay heat removal configuration is shown schematically in Figure 1 ; in the case of a LOCA, the long-term heat removal is ensured by natural circulation in a given number N loops of identical and parallel loops; only one of the N loops loops is reported for clarity of the picture: the flow path of the cooling helium gas is indicated by the black arrows. The loop has been divided into N sections = 18 sections for numerical calculation; technical details about the geometrical and structural properties of these sections are not reported here for brevity: the interested reader may refer to (Pagani et al., 2005) .
In the present analysis, the average core power to be removed is assumed to be 18.7 MW, equivalent to about 3% of full reactor power (600 MW): to guarantee natural circulation cooling at this power level, a pressure of 1650 kPa in the loops is required in nominal conditions. Finally, the secondary side of the heat exchanger (i.e., item 12 in Figure 1 ) is assumed to have a nominal wall temperature of 90 °C (Pagani et al., 2005) .
Figure 1. Schematic representation of one loop of the 600-MW GFR passive decay heat removal
system (Pagani et al., 2005) 
Uncertainties
Uncertainties affect the modeling of passive systems. There are unexpected events, e.g. the failure of a component or the variation of the geometrical dimensions and material properties, which are random in nature. This kind of uncertainty, often termed aleatory (NUREG-1150 (NUREG- , 1990 Helton, 1998; USNCR, 2002) , is not considered in this work. There is also incomplete knowledge on the properties of the system and the conditions in which the passive phenomena develop (i.e., natural circulation). This kind of uncertainty, often termed epistemic, affects the model representation of the passive system behaviour, in terms of both (model) uncertainty in the hypotheses assumed and (parameter) uncertainty in the values of the parameters of the model (Cacuci and Ionescu-Bujor, 2004; Helton et al., 2006; Patalano et al., 2008) .
Only epistemic uncertainties are considered in this work. Epistemic parameter uncertainties are associated to the reactor power level, the pressure in the loops after the LOCA and the cooler wall temperature; epistemic model uncertainties are associated to the correlations used to calculate the 
Model uncertainty
Nusselt number in forced convection, x 4 1 5%
Nusselt number in mixed convection, x 5 1 15%
Nusselt number in free convection, x 6 1 7.5%
Friction factor in forced convection, x 7 1 1%
Friction factor in mixed convection, x 8 1 10%
Friction factor in free convection, x 9 1 1.5% (Pagani et al., 2005) 
Failure criteria of the T-H passive system
The passive decay heat removal system of Figure 1 is considered failed when the temperature of the coolant helium leaving the core (item 4 in Figure 1 ) exceeds either 1200 °C in the hot channel or 850 °C in the average channel: these values are expected to limit the fuel temperature to levels which prevent excessive release of fission gases and high thermal stresses in the cooler (item 12 in Figure 1 ) and in the stainless steel cross ducts connecting the reactor vessel and the cooler (items from 6 to 11 in Figure 1 ) (Pagani et al., 2005 
According to the notation of the preceding Section 3, ( ) 
Building and testing the ANN and quadratic RS regression models
RS and ANN models have been built with training sets x }, p = 1, 2, …., N train (Zhang and Foschi, 2004) . Then, the T-H model code has been run with each of the input vectors x p , p = 1, 2, …, N train , to obtain the corresponding bidimensional output vectors y p = µ y (x p ) = {y 1,p , y 2,p }, p = 1, 2, …, N train (in the present case study, the number n o of outputs is equal to 2, i.e., the hot-and average-channel coolant outlet temperatures, as explained in Section 4.2). The training data set
thereby obtained has been used to calibrate the adjustable parameters w * of the regression models, for best fitting the T-H model code data. More specifically, the straightforward least squares method has been used to find the parameters of the quadratic RSs (Bucher and Most, 2008) and the common error back-propagation algorithm has been applied to train the ANNs (Rumelhart et al., 1986) . Note that a single ANN can be trained to estimate both outputs of the model here of interest, whereas a specific quadratic RS must be developed for each output to be estimated.
The choice of the ANN architecture is critical for the regression accuracy. In particular, the number of neurons in the network determines the number of adjustable parameters available to optimally fit the complicated, nonlinear T-H model code response surface by interpolation of the available training data. The number of neurons in the input layer is n i = 9, equal to the number of uncertain input parameters; the number n o of outputs is equal to 2, the outputs of interest; the number n h of nodes in the hidden layer is 4 for N train = 20, 30, 70 and 100, whereas it is 5 for N train = 50, determined by trial-and-error. In case of a network with too few neurons (i.e., too few parameters), the regression function f(x, w * ) has insufficient flexibility to adjust its response surface to fit the data adequately: this results in poor generalization properties of interpolation when new input patterns are fed to the network to obtain the corresponding output; on the opposite side, excessively increasing the flexibility of the model by introducing too many parameters, e.g., by adding neurons, may make the network overfit the training data, leading again to poor generalization performance when interpolating new input data. A trade-off is typically sought by controlling the neural model complexity, i.e., the number of parameters, and the training procedure, e.g., by adding a regularization term in the error function or by early stopping the training, so as to achieve a good fit of the training data with a reasonably smooth regression function which is not over-fit to the data and therefore capable of generalization when interpolating new input data (Bishop, 1995) . In the present work, early stopping is adopted: a validation input/output data set 
Figure 2. Early stopping the ANN training to avoid overfitting
As measures of the ANN and RS model accuracy, the commonly adopted coefficient of determination 2 R and RMSE have been computed for each output y l , l = 1, 2, on a new data set
of size N test = 20, purposely generated for testing the regression models built (Marrel et al., 2009) , and thus different from those used during training and validation. 
Determination of the 95 th percentiles of the coolant outlet temperatures
For illustration purposes, a configuration with N loops = 3 loops is considered for the passive system = 20, 30, 50, 70 and 100 data examples; the "true" (i.e., reference) iii. performing N T = 250000 evaluations of each of the B = 1000 bootstrapped ANN and RS regression models; the corresponding CPU times are on average 6 min (i.e., 0.1 h) and 4.5 min (i.e., about 0.08 h) for the ANNs and the RSs, respectively.
The overall CPU times required by the use of bootstrapped ANNs (i.e., on average 2.22 h) and quadratic RSs (i.e., on average 0.43 h) is about 90 and 480 times, respectively, lower than that required by the use of the original T-H model code (i.e., on average 209 h). The CPU time required by the ANNs is about 5 times larger than that required by the quadratic RSs, mainly due to the elaborate training algorithm needed to build the structurally complex neural model.
Functional failure probability estimation
In this Section, the bootstrapped ANNs and quadratic RSs are compared in the task of estimating the functional failure probability of the 600-MW GFR passive decay heat removal system of Figure   1 . The previous system configuration with N loops = 3 is analyzed. It can be seen that as the size of the training sample N train increases, both the ANN and quadratic RS provide increasingly accurate estimates of the true functional failure probability P(F), as one would expect. On the other hand, in the cases of small training sets (e.g., N train = 20, 30 and 50) the functional failure probabilities are significantly underestimated by both the bootstrapped ANN and the quadratic RS models (e.g., the BBC point estimates ( ) BBC F P for P(F) lie between 9.81·10 -5 and 2.45·10 -4 ) and the associated uncertainties are quite large (e.g., the widths of the corresponding BBC 95% CIs are between 3.47·10 -4 and 7.91·10 -4 ). Two considerations seem in order with respect to these results. First, in these cases of small data sets available the analyst would still be able to correctly estimate the order of magnitude of a small failure probability (i.e., P(F) ~ 10 -4 ), in spite of the low number of runs of the T-H code performed to generate the N train = 20, 30 or 50 input/output examples; second, the accuracy of an estimate should be evaluated in relation to the requirements of the specific application; for example, although the confidence interval provided by the bootstrapped ANNs trained with N train = 50 samples ranges from 8.03·10 -5 to 4.27·10 -4 , this variability might be acceptable for demonstrating that the system satisfies the target safety goals.
Finally, it is worth noting that although bootstrapped ANNs provide better estimates and lower model uncertainties than quadratic RSs, the difference in the performances of the two regression models is less evident than in the case of percentile estimation (Section 5.2). This may be due to the fact that estimating the value of the functional failure probability P(F) is a simpler task than estimating the exact values of the corresponding coolant outlet temperatures. For example, let the true value of the hot channel coolant outlet temperature be 1250 °C and the corresponding estimate by the regression model be 1500 °C: in such a case, the estimate is absolutely inaccurate in itself, but "exact" for the purpose of functional failure probability estimation with respect to a failure threshold of 1200 °C.
Finally, the computational times required for the estimation of the functional failure probability, and the corresponding confidence interval, in the case of N train = 100 are 2.32 h and 0.50 h for the bootstrapped ANNs and quadratic RSs, respectively.
Conclusions
In this paper, Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) and quadratic Response Surfaces (RSs) have been compared in the task of estimating, in a fast and efficient way, the probability of functional failure of a T-H passive system. A case study involving the natural convection cooling in a Gas-cooled as expected, the difference in the performances of the two regression models is much more evident in the estimation of the 95 th percentiles than in the (easier) task of estimating the functional failure probability of the system. Due to their flexibility in nonlinear modelling, ANNs have been shown to provide more reliable estimates than quadratic RSs even when they are trained with very low numbers of data examples (e.g., 20, 30 or 50) from the original T-H model code.
The bootstrap method has been employed to estimate confidence intervals on the quantities computed: this uncertainty quantification is of paramount importance in safety critical applications, in particular when few data examples are used. In this regard, bootstrapped ANNs have been shown to produce narrower confidence intervals than bootstrapped quadratic RSs in all the analyses performed.
On the basis of the results obtained, bootstrapped ANNs can be considered more effective than quadratic RSs in the estimation of the functional failure probability of T-H passive systems (while quantifying the uncertainty associated to the results) because they provide more accurate (i.e., estimates are closer to the true values) and precise (i.e., confidence intervals are narrower) estimates than quadratic RSs; on the other hand, the computational time required by bootstrapped ANNs is somewhat longer than that required by quadratic RSs, due to the elaborate training algorithm for building the structurally complex neural model.
